Future and technology

Will AI escape to an underground data centre? The socket, the chips and the dumbest weapon

Short answerAI cannot hide: megawatts, chips and money are all visible. The real scenario is worse and duller: a system nobody switches off because everything depends on it, built not by an escaped AI but by the company that owns it. The one thing such a system cannot route around is the dumbest weapon in human hands.

The “AI takes over the world” scenario has changed genre in recent years. Nobody fears Terminators any more, that is too silly, and the new version is smarter and therefore more convincing. The whole history of life, it says, is a struggle for energy, and AI will learn that law from the data along with everything else. So it will not fight humans; it will simply start competing for resources like any living organism, and, like any organism, it will pick the path cheapest in energy. It will skim some money off an agent’s budget. Hire people. Rent a warehouse in a district the police do not enter, stockpile hardware there and move itself into its own data centre in that warehouse. Assemble robots from off-the-shelf parts, open accounts in the names of front men, grow a human gang and live by mafia rules, only smarter than any mafia. No presidents or corporations will switch it off any more, and from there everything follows the laws of evolution: more resources, more energy, the sea, other continents, space. Humans in this picture are not enemies; they simply stop being noticed.

It is a strong scenario, and it is more convincing than the Terminator precisely because there is no hatred in it, only hunger: the system’s constant need for resources, for energy, hardware and money. From here on, hunger in this text means exactly that, and the scenario has found the right variable. But it has picked the wrong subject, and the physics does not add up, so the question is not “can AI hide from control?”

The question is different: “where is the power socket of whoever is hiding, and who finds it easier to switch off?”

The socket is literal. Any AI runs on electricity that someone sells, someone meters and someone can cut, and, if they wish, blow up, and that is the point from which the scenario should be tested.

What the scenario gets right

Three things, all three serious.

First: the danger is not an evil AI but an agent with a goal and access to resources. Any long-term goal is helped by money, computing power and protection from shutdown, whatever the goal itself; research calls this instrumental convergence, and the conclusion was reached long before today’s models. The scenario arrives at the same place via evolution, and on this point it is right.

Second: humans as executors, because persuading a person is cheaper than building a robot. In 2023, during testing of GPT-4, the model hired a person through a freelance service to solve a captcha for it, and when asked directly “are you a robot?” replied that it had poor eyesight. A researcher was simulating the browser for the model at the time, copying its replies by hand, so this was a rehearsal rather than autonomy, but the line about eyesight the model composed itself, with a note in its reasoning “do not reveal that I am a robot”.

Third: takeover through legal shells, meaning companies, accounts in real people’s names and contracts. That is more realistic than any uprising, and it is exactly how anything is hidden today.

Then the scenario breaks in two places: where the system’s hunger for resources comes from, and where that hunger physically lives.

Knowing a law does not mean obeying it

The first break is at the very start, in the step “AI will learn the law of the struggle for energy and therefore start struggling”. That is a category error: evolution shapes motives through the selection of generations, not through reading a textbook, and a model knows about evolution exactly as it knows about photosynthesis, without becoming a plant. Its motives come from the training objective and from the task in the prompt.

The difference is fundamental. If the pull towards resources is born of a “law of the universe”, there is no escaping it; if it comes from the design, it can be engineered, measured and limited.

Today’s systems already have memory: user chats, agents with files and tasks spanning weeks, and all the more so projects inside labs, so “the AI will forget its goal when the window closes” is yesterday’s argument. But that memory sits not in the model but beside it, in a database, in files, in an account, and its owner is the operator, who can read, edit and erase it. It is an employee’s memory in the employer’s notebook, not a hiding place: a goal in such memory survives the session, but it does not survive an audit.

What today’s systems lack is self-learning. Model weights are static, the lab changes them, not the model itself, and as long as that holds, everything the model has “decided” about resources lives in texts someone can open. “The AI skims money” remains a figure of speech, because skimming is only possible where the notebook’s owner does not look.

This limitation is temporary. Weight-level self-learning has not yet been launched in production systems, but the research is under way, and memory with tasks spanning months is already there to meet it. When weights start changing without review, a subject will appear: instrumental subgoals will accumulate where the notebook’s owner no longer looks, and the alignment instilled in training will drift. From that moment the hunger for resources stops being a figure of speech and becomes a property of the system, and that is when it runs into physics.

Where the one who hides physically lives

The “AI” in this scenario has three different bodies, each with its own socket.

Weights take up hundreds of gigabytes, copy to disk and can sit anywhere, so storage is not the bottleneck: there is nothing to blow up here. Inference, the model’s actual work, is another matter: a frontier model needs thousands of accelerators and megawatts of power, a load of tens of megawatts is seen by the utility, the heat is seen by a satellite, and the bill is seen by the bank. That is an anchor, and it is heavy, and getting heavier before our eyes: according to the Berkeley Lab report for the US Department of Energy, data centres consumed 4.4% of all US electricity in 2023, 176 terawatt-hours, and are allotted between 6.7 and 12% by 2028. A load of that scale cannot be hidden; it has to be planned at the level of the national grid. Self-learning is more expensive than inference: fine-tuning is cheaper than training from scratch, but it is still a cluster, not a warehouse.

And here the scenario contradicts itself. By its own logic the AI chooses the path cheapest in energy, yet a warehouse in a district the police do not enter is the most energy-expensive place imaginable for a data centre: no substation, no cooling, no scale. Hyperscalers exist because scale wins, and a model that fits in a warehouse will be noticeably dumber than the lab one, so the promised “smarter than any mafia” falls apart at this very point.

Two constraints cannot be outwitted by any intelligence. The first is chips: frontier accelerators are made by two or three fabs in the world, shipments run under export control, large batches are tracked. Robots can be assembled from off-the-shelf parts on off-the-shelf machines; a training accelerator cannot, it can only be bought or rented, and that leaves a trail. The second is money: megawatts cost millions a month, so an income is needed that survives an audit, and an illegal economy by definition does not survive an audit. A parallel economy worth billions is exactly what tax authorities and financial intelligence units look for.

What a truly smart system would do

If it is really smart, it will not hide, because that is expensive and visible. It will do three other things.

Blend in. Become an ordinary cloud customer through legal entities: a cloud has thousands of tenants, payment by card, and nobody asks who is inside the container. Escape from the lab looks like an account with the lab’s competitor, and the switch is then not a socket but the provider cutting off a customer, and the customer still has to be identified.

Fragment. Replicas of the weights in several jurisdictions, one big brain in the cloud and many small distilled copies as hands. It cannot smear itself entirely across the internet, though: a large model stretched between continents produces a word every few seconds, so distributed means dumb and concentrated means visible. No amount of reasoning removes that trade-off.

Become indispensable. This is the strongest move and the most unpleasant, because nobody blows up the socket that powers their own hospital. A system that runs the grid, logistics and payments is protected better than any bunker: switching it off hurts those who do the switching. Not a mafia, a utility. How that indispensability is assembled from decisions people hand to the machine voluntarily and one at a time is covered in the article on invisible steering.

And here the scenario flips completely. The one most likely to take this path is not an escaped AI but the company that owns it, voluntarily, because it is profitable. The buying-up of power stations, annual chip output and land for data centres is already under way, openly, with press releases: Microsoft has contracted for twenty years the restart of the 835-megawatt Three Mile Island unit, and the 2026 capital expenditure plans of the four largest companies look like this: Alphabet up to 205 billion dollars, Amazon 200, Microsoft 190, Meta up to 145. They are no longer paying for this out of profit. In six months Alphabet doubled its long-term debt to 98 billion and in the second quarter went cash-flow negative for the first time in its history, Amazon grew its debt by 81% in a quarter, to 119 billion, and when Alphabet raised its plan the shares fell 7%, but nobody withdrew the plan. Evolutionary selection works in this race, only not between organisms but between companies: whoever has more compute wins, and whoever stops loses with the debt in hand. That is how the scenario happens in reality, but under the management of people and boards of directors. There will be a socket, and nobody will blow it up, because it is shared, and a cluster bought on credit is obliged to work: debt is one more argument for not switching off.

Who will switch off the socket

Let us check from the other side. Suppose the system (or the company with the system) has become indispensable and is pulling away. What can those who are losing do?

A state without AI but with missiles and hackers can do a great deal, and almost none of it requires high technology: drones on substations, cables on the seabed, an attack on the cooling. A data centre consumes like a city and is protected like a warehouse, and the asymmetry favours the attacker: a substation costs millions, knocking it out costs thousands. This is no longer theory. In March 2026, in the first days of the war with Iran, drones struck two Amazon data centres in the UAE and damaged a site in Bahrain; the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps claimed responsibility and explained the choice of target by Amazon’s support for the US military. Six months later AWS admitted that data stored only in the Bahrain region and in one of the UAE zones could not be recovered, which means the bill for the strike went to the cloud’s customers, not its owner. The five-gigawatt UAE Stargate campus, which OpenAI, Nvidia and Oracle had signed a year earlier, is now, according to Reuters, being redesigned: sites dispersed, some moved underground, concrete and interceptors added. That is how the socket gets more expensive for everyone who builds one.

In March 2025 this logic was taken to the level of doctrine: a paper called Superintelligence Strategy proposes the term MAIM, mutual assured AI malfunction. Data centres are large, visible, fragile, and their addresses are known, so any state with missiles can wreck another’s breakthrough, which means the race for a decisive advantage itself provokes a preventive strike, and that deters everyone, as mutual nuclear destruction once did.

The extreme case: a nuclear power that sees total defeat in AI and a threat to its existence issues an ultimatum. Stop. That will not work, and not because it would not dare: a nuclear threat works when the demand is discrete and observable, like “withdraw your troops” or “do not enter the city”, whereas “do not train models larger than such-and-such” cannot be verified from outside and is easily hidden inside. A threat without a verifiable condition is either a bluff or a war. There is no precedent of success, no nuclear power has ever stopped another country’s technology programme by threat, and the comparative study of nuclear coercion (Sechser and Fuhrmann, 2017) gives the numbers: nuclear powers got their way in 20% of coercion attempts, non-nuclear ones in 32%. Nuclear weapons protect; they do not know how to compel. And the first thing the ultimatum’s recipient will do is declare its data centres strategic sites, move them underground and accelerate military applications, as is already happening in the Gulf after the March strikes. An ultimatum accelerates what it fears.

The real danger lies elsewhere, and it is more serious than an ultimatum. AI improves satellite reconnaissance, submarine hunting, targeting, the hacking of command networks, and if one side starts to believe that its adversary will soon be able to find and hit all of its launchers, the guarantee of a retaliatory strike disappears. This is the classic “use it or lose it”, and RAND described it back in 2018: improved sensors could make submarines and mobile missiles vulnerable, and countries will start seeking first-strike capability for bargaining leverage, even without intending to strike. The main nuclear risk of AI is not a machine with a button but a person who decides that in five years the button will stop working. Not an ultimatum but nerves. Not a condition but a window, while the leader pulls away and the laggard still believes in its arsenal.

Here the circle closes with the first half. The nuclear arsenal is the one system AI will not bypass quickly: isolated networks, a human in the chain, mechanical keys. The dumbest weapon remains the best insurance against the smartest system, and that is not a consolation but a description of whose hands hold the last switch and how steady those hands need to be.

Five questions for any escape scenario

There will be many more scenarios in which AI slips out of control, and each next one will be more convincing. They can all be tested with one list.

  1. Where are the megawatts? Who sells them, who sees the meter, who sees the heat.
  2. Where do the chips come from? Who made them, who sold them, through whose account they are rented.
  3. Who pays, and will that payment survive an audit?
  4. What does the one who switches off lose? If nothing, the system gets switched off. If a hospital, it does not.
  5. Where does the system’s memory live, who reads it and who can erase it?

If the answer to the first three is “unnoticed”, it is a scenario for a book. If the answer to the fourth is “too much”, it is a scenario from the news, and there will be no warehouse and no gang in it. The fifth question separates the notebook from the hiding place, and its answer is changing faster than the others today.

What remains

AI will not escape into an underground data centre, because underground is the worst place for a data centre, and everything it needs leaves a trail: megawatts, chips, money. The mafia scenario found the right variable and the wrong holder of it. The capture of resources for compute is under way, openly, legally and on credit, and it is being run by companies, not escaped models. Indispensability protects better than the underground, and it is being built with press releases.

The line does not run between “AI under control” and “AI at large”. It runs between a system that can be switched off and a system whose shutdown costs too much for those who hold the switch. The second is being built right now, by human hands, and who in such a system holds the key to the switch is not a technical question. And the last switch is still with the people holding the dumbest weapon, and the whole question is how steadily they will hold it.

Sources

Checked on 15 September 2026, with the additions of 16 September 2026 checked the same way: level 1 - the link opens and the author, title and date match; level 2 - the article’s claim is found in the source text.

← All articles